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1 Introduction
What is the impact of asymmetric internal and external trade costs on the spatial
distribution of the industrial activity and on the welfare of the different interest
groups in an economy?
Trade costs, broadly defined by Anderson and Wincoop (2004):
“include all costs incurred in getting a good to a final user other than the marginal
cost of producing the good itself: transportation costs (both freight costs and time
costs), policy barriers (tariffs and nontariff barriers), information costs, contract
enforcement costs, costs associated with the use of different currencies, legal and
regulatory costs, and local distribution costs (wholesale and retail).”
It is clear that trade costs are highly variable across countries. They are higher
in landlocked countries than in coastal countries (Lima˜o and Venables, 2001) and
higher in developing countries than in industrialized countries (Anderson and Win-
coop, 2004). Differences in trade costs, particularly those associated with the dis-
tance to the larger markets, explain some of the income inequality across countries
(Redding and Venables, 2004).
The economic relevance of trade costs is beyond doubt, being equivalent (in indus-
trialized countries) to a 170 % ad valorem tax equivalent, that can be decomposed
into a 55% domestic trade cost, associated with local distribution, and a 74 % in-
ternational trade cost (Anderson and Wincoop, 2004).
A monotonic relationship between trade costs and location of the economic activity
is one of the main theoretical findings of the ‘New Economic Geography’ literature.
If trade costs are high, economic activity is dispersed across regions, while if trade
costs are low, then economic activity becomes concentrated in one region.1
This recent literature has allowed an understanding of a variety of matters in its
relation with the location of economic activity such as trade policy (Baldwin et al.,
2003), economic development (Murata, 2002), qualification (Mori and Turrini, 2005;
Toulemonde, 2006), quality of the infrastructure (Martin and Rogers, 1995) and the
structure of the transport network (Fujita and Mori, 1996; Mun, 2004). A welfare
1The concept of “region” may refer to locations ranging from small geographical regions like
cities (Fujita and Krugman, 1995; Mori, 1997) to larger areas such as countries or even continents
(Krugman and Venables, 1995).
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analysis of the agglomeration process was carried out by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002).
In spite of the empirical evidence, most of the theoretical work has neglected the
differences in trade costs across regions and the trade costs that are internal to a
region, focusing on the case of symmetric trade costs associated with trade across
regions.2
In this paper, we extend the model introduced by Krugman (1991) to allow for:
(i) the existence of intra-regional (internal) trade costs, possibly different between
regions; and (ii) the existence of asymmetric inter-regional (external) trade costs.
By asymmetric external trade costs we mean that the cost of trading from region
1 to region 2 is different from the cost of trading from region 2 to region 1. The
assumption that trade costs from region 1 to region 2 are identical to those from
region 2 to region 1 is pervasive in the existing literature. Nevertheless, it is clear that
some trade barriers like tariffs and import quotas are unilateral (at least asymmetric)
and that there may be different degrees of trade liberalization.3 This asymmetry was
illustrated by Krugman and Venables (1995, Section V) in the form of a unilateral
import tariff.
There are papers that consider internal and external trade costs in new economic
geography models, but none addressing the problem of extending the base model of
Krugman (1991).
Martin and Rogers (1995) have considered asymmetric internal and external trans-
portation costs in an economy with two countries, but in their model workers are
immobile between regions. Therefore, it does not capture agglomeration as a self-
reinforcing process generated by demand-linkage and cost-linkage circular causality.4
A kind of internal and external transportation costs also appears in Mansori (2003),
who considers a country composed by two identical regions which trade with the
2See, for example, the works of Krugman (1991), Fujita and Krugman (1995), Mori (1997),
Ottaviano and Puga (1998), Puga (1999), Fujita, Krugman and Venables (2001), Baldwin et al.
(2003), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004) and the references therein.
3See Baldwin et al. (2003) for an overview on trade policy and economic geography.
4When workers migrate to a region, the size of the market increases, fostering economic activity
in this region (demand-linkage). When economic activity is transfered to a region, trade costs in
this region decrease, attracting workers (cost-linkage). See Baldwin et al. (2003) for a detailed
explanation of the difference between the basic core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991) and the
footloose captal model (Martin and Rogers, 1995).
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rest of the world. Each region has a different cost of trading with the rest of the
world, and there is also trade between the two regions.
Behrens et al. (2007) proposed a model in which there are two identical countries
formed by two regions between which labor is mobile, while there is no international
labor mobility. Goods can be traded both nationally and internationally at different
costs. Particularly, they assume that countries have different internal trade costs,
but still an identical external trade cost.
In sum, we study an economy in which there are agglomeration forces generated by
the mobility of the industrial population, allowing for asymmetric internal and ex-
ternal trade costs. Technically, we extend Krugman’s (1991) model to accommodate
four different trade costs: external trade costs from region 1 to region 2 and from 2
to 1, and internal trade costs within region 1 and within region 2.5
We show that in the case of symmetric trade costs, the model is equivalent to the
original model of Krugman (1991) with trade cost equal to the ratio between the
external and the internal trade cost. The trade cost considered in the existing
literature can, thus, be interpreted as the ratio between external and internal trade
costs. Recall that this ratio was measured as a 74% tax by Anderson and Wincoop
(2004).6 The measures of the total trade cost as a 170% tax and of the domestic
component as a 55% tax are irrelevant for the agglomeration process.
Not surprisingly, we find that industrial activity tends to shift to the region with
lower internal trade costs, and to the region with higher cost of importing (lower
cost of exporting).
Considering a decrease of the internal trade cost of a region, we find that, in this
region, the real wages of the workers increase in the short-run, and economic activity
increases in the long-run (workers migrate to the region). In terms of welfare, we
observe a “win-lose” situation. In the short-run, the welfare of workers improves in
this region but worsens in the other region, while the welfare of farmers improves in
both regions (because prices go down).
In the case of a unilateral decrease in the cost of importing, there are different
possible effects. If the size of the industrial sector is small, the real wages of the
5We do not address the issue of assigning trade costs to agricultural goods. See Fujita, Krugman
and Venables (2001, chapter 7).
6A tax of 74% corresponds to an iceberg cost parameter of 0.57 = 1/1.74. To receive 1 unit,
the customer pays 1.74.
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workers decrease in the short-run and economic activity decreases in the long-run. If
the industrial sector is large, we arrive at the opposite conclusion. The real wages of
the other regions’ workers always increases. The welfare of farmers always improves
in the region, and worsens in the other region.
In the next section we present an extension of the model of Krugman (1991) which
accommodates different internal and external trade costs. Section 3 includes the
main results, being divided into three subsections which corresponds to the cases
of symmetric trade costs, asymmetric internal trade costs, and asymmetric exter-
nal trade costs. Section 4 concludes the paper with some remarks. Proofs of the
analytical results can be found in the appendixes.
2 The model
2.1 Setup
The economy comprises two sectors (agriculture and industry) and two regions (1
and 2). Regions are symmetric in terms of technology and preferences, but may
have different internal and external trade costs.
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces a homogeneous good
under constant returns to scale, using only labor supplied by farmers, who are
immobile between regions.
The manufacturing sector is monopolistic competitive and produces a continuum
of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product using only labor supplied by
workers, who are mobile between regions.
Preferences
Both farmers and workers share a utility function of the form
U = CµMC
1−µ
A , (1)
where CA is consumption of the agricultural goods and CM is consumption of a
manufactures aggregate. This functional form implies that 0 < µ < 1 is the share
of spending on manufactured goods.
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The manufacturing firms produce horizontally differentiated products, with the man-
ufactures aggregate being defined as:
CM =
[∫ N
0
c
(σ−1)/σ
i di
]σ/(σ−1)
,
where N is the quantity of horizontally differentiated products, ci is the consumption
of the i differentiated product and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among the
products. A low σ means that the products have a high degree of differentiation (or
that the consumers have a high preference for variety).
Supply of factors
A fraction 0 < µ < 1 of the population works in the manufacturing sector, while the
remaining, 1 − µ, works in the agricultural sector.7 Farmers are evenly distributed
between the regions, thus the agricultural population in each region is fixed and
equal to 1−µ
2
.
The industrial population in regions 1 and 2 is L1 and L2, with L1 + L2 = µ. We
denote the share of workers in region 1 by f = L1
L1+L2
(the share of workers in region
2 is, obviously, 1− f).
Manufacturing sector
Production of each variety requires a fixed input involving α > 0 units of labor and
a variable input involving β > 0 units of labor, supplied by the industrial workers.
The cost function, in region j, is:
CTj = Wj(α + βxi),
where CTj is the cost to produce one unit of some variety, Wj is the nominal wage
of the workers in region j, and xi is the output produced by the firm.
Given the profit-maximization pricing behavior of manufacturing firms that operate
in a monopolistic competitive sector, the price of any manufactured product in
region j is:
pj =
σ
σ − 1βWj.
7The coincidence between the share of population in each sector and the share of spending on
each sector only implies the equality between wages in both sectors, in equilibrium.
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Free entry of firms into the manufacturing sector drives profits to zero, which implies
that all firms produce the same output, given by:
xi =
α(σ − 1)
β
.
Each firm employs the same number of workers, therefore:
L1
L2
=
n1
n2
,
where nj is the number of firms in region j.
Agricultural sector
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and has constant returns to scale.
One unit of labor supplied by farmers is used to produce one unit of the agricultural
good. Trade costs in this sector are neglected, therefore, the price of the agricultural
good is the same in both regions, and chosen as the numeraire.
pA = WA = 1,
where pA is the price of the agricultural good and WA is the nominal wage of the
farmers in both regions.
Trade costs
So far, we have presented the model of Krugman (1991). We now extend it by
allowing for the existence of asymmetric trade costs between regions as well as
different internal trade costs.
The trade of manufactures involves an iceberg trade cost. Of each unit of manufac-
tures shipped from region i to region j, only a fraction 0 < τij < 1 arrives. Thus,
a high τij corresponds to a low trade cost. The trade of agricultural products is
assumed to be costless.8
Figure 1 represents the configuration of the economy with two regions and four
different trade costs. The parameter τ12 represents the cost of shipping the man-
ufactured goods from region 1 to region 2, while τ21 represents the cost necessary
8This assumption was relaxed by Adrian (1996). Agricultural transport costs were shown to
render agglomeration of industry less likely.
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Figure 1: Asymmetric internal and external trade costs
to ship the manufactured goods from region 2 to region 1. We designate these as
external trade costs. We also consider trade costs for goods that are produced and
consumed in the same region, τ11 and τ22, and designate them as internal trade costs.
We assume that the internal trade costs are lower than the external trade costs.
2.2 Short-Run equilibrium
In the short-run, the spatial distribution of workers is taken as given (migrations do
not occur). We start by computing output and nominal wages. After we compute
prices and check whether there are incentives for workers to migrate by comparing
the real wages in each region.
Demand
We denote consumption in region i of a representative region j product by Cji.
In region 1, the price of a local product is p1/τ11, with τ11 < 1, while the price of an
imported product is p2/τ21. Consumption is given by:
C11 =
(
p1
τ11
)−σ
and C21 =
(
p2
τ21
)−σ
.
The expenditure on local manufactures, E11, and on foreign manufactures, E21, is:
E11 =
(
p1
τ11
)1−σ
n1 and E21 =
(
p2
τ21
)1−σ
n2
Given E11 and E21, we define Z11 as the ratio between region 1’s expenditure on local
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manufactures and region 1’s expenditure on manufactures imported from region 2:
Z11 =
E11
E21
=
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
n1
n2
=
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
. (2)
With a similar procedure we obtain Z12, the ratio between region 2’s spending on
region 1 products and local products:
Z12 =
E12
E22
=
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
. (3)
Nominal wages
Let Y1 and Y2 denote the nominal regional income, which is equal to the sum of the
incomes in the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors:
Y1 =
1− µ
2
+W1L1 and Y2 =
1− µ
2
+W2L2. (4)
The nominal wage of workers in region 1 is equal to the spending on region 1’s
manufactures:
L1W1 =
Z11
1 + Z11
µY1 +
Z12
1 + Z12
µY2 ⇔ W1 = µ
L1
[
Z11
1 + Z11
Y1 +
Z12
1 + Z12
Y2
]
. (5)
Similarly, the nominal wage of workers in region 2 is:
W2 =
µ
L2
[
1
1 + Z11
Y1 +
1
1 + Z12
Y2
]
. (6)
Expressions (4)-(6) imply that the sum of the nominal wages across all agents is
invariant:
L1W1 + L2W2 = µ. (7)
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Equations (2)-(4) allow us to write (5) and (6) in the following way:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ
2
+W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ
2
+W2L2)
1 +
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
 ; (8)
W2 =
µ
L2
 1−µ2 +W1L1
1 +
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
1−µ
2
+W2L2
1 +
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
 . (9)
Equations (8) and (9) constitute a system that determines W1 and W2 for a given
distribution of workers between regions 1 and 2. Using (7), equation (8) can be
written as a function of W1 and equation (9) can be written as a function of W2.
Price index and real wage
Workers are interested not in nominal wages but in real wages, and these depend
on the cost of living in each region.
The price indices, P1 and P2, reflect the relationship between expenditure and utility
for individuals in region 1 and region 2, respectively. These depend on the price
of the agricultural products (normalized to 1) as well as on the price indices of
manufactured goods, PM1 and PM2.
PM1 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ21
)1−σ] 11−σ
;
PM2 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ22
)1−σ] 11−σ
.
where f = L1
L1+L2
and γ = σβ
σ−1
[
µ
α
β
(σ−1)
] 1
1−σ
.
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We have P1 = P
1−µ
A P
µ
M1 = P
µ
M1 and P2 = P
1−µ
A P
µ
M2 = P
µ
M2. Therefore:
P1 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ21
)1−σ]− µσ−1
; (10)
P2 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ22
)1−σ]− µσ−1
. (11)
The maximization of (1) yields consumption of each product (manufacture aggregate
and agricultural good), and given the price index of each of them, we obtain the
utility in region i for workers, UMi , and farmers, U
A
i :
UMi = µ
µ(1− µ)1−µWi
Pi
and UAi = µ
µ(1− µ)1−µ 1
Pi
. (12)
Workers seek the region with the highest utility or, equivalently, the highest real
wage. From equations (8), (9), (10) and (11), we obtain the relative real wage,
ω1/ω2:
ω1
ω2
=
W1
P1
W2
P2
=
W1
[
f
(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ22
)1−σ] µ1−σ
W2
[
f
(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τ21
)1−σ] µ1−σ .
2.3 Long-Run Equilibrium
The short-run equilibrium variables are determined taking as given the amount of
industrial workers in each region, f . The long-run equilibrium is a situation where
migration does not occur. We say that it is stable if it is robust to small perturbations
of the distribution of workers across regions.
Dispersion is a long-run equilibrium configuration if regions have the same real
wage. It is stable if a small migration to region 1 decreases the real wage in region
1, implying that the initial configuration is reestablished. Precisely:
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ = 1 and
[
∂
(
w1
w2
)
/∂f
]
|f=f∗ < 0.
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If the equilibrium share of population in region 1 is 0.5 (f ∗ = 0.5), we say that
dispersion is symmetric (otherwise, it is asymmetric).
Concentration is a long-run equilibrium configuration if all workers are concentrated
in the region that has the highest real wage. Unless real wages exactly coincide, it
is stable.
f ∗ = 1 and
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ ≥ 1 (concentration in region 1).
f ∗ = 0 and
ω1
ω2
|f=f∗ ≤ 1 (concentration in region 2).
3 Results
In this section, we consider three different cases.
1. Symmetric internal and external trade costs: (τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi).
2. Asymmetric internal trade costs: (τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 6= τ22).
3. Asymmetric external trade costs: (τ12 6= τ21 and τ11 = τ22 = τi).
We provide analytical results for short-run equilibria and simulations describing the
long-run behavior.
3.1 Symmetric internal and external trade costs
Suppose that regions have equal internal trade costs, τ11 = τ22 = τi, and symmetric
external trade costs, τ12 = τ21 = τe.
In a short-run equilibrium, the relative real wage, ω1
ω2
, is the same as in the model of
Krugman (1991), with τ = τe
τi
.9 In this sense, we can reinterpret the trade cost in
the model of Krugman (1991) as a ratio between external and internal trade costs.
9Recall that the model of Krugman (1991) only considers the external trade cost.
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Proposition 3.1. When regions have equal internal trade costs, τ11 = τ22 = τi, and
equal external trade costs, τ21 = τ12 = τe, the ratio between ω1 and ω2 is the same
as in the case in which regions have only an external trade cost equal to τ = τe
τi
.
The proof of this result is provided in the appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of a decrease of internal trade costs on the relative real
wage (external trade costs are kept constant).
Figure 2: The spatial distribution of the economic activity with symmetric
internal and external trade costs (τe = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4). An increase in τi
from 2/3 to 1 (a decrease in the internal trade costs) corresponds to a decrease in τ from
0.75 to 0.5. This figure is the same as the figure in Krugman (1991).
The bold line in figure 2 corresponds to short-run equilibria (f, ω1
ω2
) in which there are
no internal trade costs (τi = 1) while the external trade costs are equal to 0.5 (the
ratio between external and internal trade costs is τ = τe
τi
= 0.5). Any combination
between internal and external trade costs such that τe
τi
= 0.5 leads to the same
relative real wage (Proposition 3.1), and therefore to the same spatial distribution
of economic activity.
The dotted line corresponds to short-run equilibria in which the internal trade costs
are 2/3 and the external trade costs are 0.5. In this case, the ratio between the
external an internal trade costs is τ = τe
τi
= 0.75.
When the ratio between the internal and external trade costs changes, there is a
change in the short-run equilibria. In this example, the decrease of internal trade
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costs (from τi = 2/3 to τi = 1) changes the equilibrium configuration from agglo-
meration to symmetric dispersion.
3.2 Asymmetric internal trade costs
What is the impact of a unilateral decrease in the internal trade costs:
• On the relative real wage, in the short-run?
• On the welfare of each interest group, in the short-run?
• On the distribution of industrial activity, in the long-run?
We provide analytical results for the first two questions, and use simulation to
characterize the distribution of economic activity in the long-run. Proofs can be
found in the appendix.
For the analytical results, we have chosen parameter values such that the initial
long-run equilibrium is characterized by symmetric dispersion of economic activity.
We start out with regions that have symmetric trade costs (τ12 = τ21 = τe and
τ11 = τ22 = τi) and we consider a marginal decrease of the internal trade cost of
region 2 (an increase in τ22).
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We study the two types of long-run equilibrium: dispersion and concentration.
Short-run effect on the relative real wage
Figure 3 compares short-run equilibria in the symmetric case (τ22 = τ11) with short-
run equilibria when region 2 has lower internal trade costs (i.e. τ22 > τ11). Of course
that, starting from a symmetric setting, analogous results are obtained for τ11 > τ22,
by interchanging the regions.
The curve which depicts the short-run equilibria moves downwards, which means
that workers in region 2 will have a higher real wage than workers in region 1, in
10Recall that, for each unit produced and sold in region 2, a fraction τ22 is consumed, while
1− τ22 is dissipated as trade costs.
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Figure 3: Short-run equilibria and asymmetric internal trade costs (τe = 0.5,
µ = 0.3 and σ = 4). Point A is an initial asymmetric dispersion equilibrium in which
τ11 = τ22 = 0.95. A decrease of the internal trade costs in region 2 (an increase in τ22
from 0.95 to 0.97) leads the economy from A to B, in the short-run.
the short-run. In particular, for f = 0.5, the relative real wage in region 1, ω1
ω2
, is a
decreasing function of τ22.
According to proposition 3.2, and considering as a starting point a symmetric dis-
persion equilibrium in which τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ22 = τ11 = τi, this outcome occurs
for any value of σ and µ.
Proposition 3.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. The relative real
wage, ω1
ω2
, is a decreasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
Short-run effect on the welfare of the four interest groups
There are four interest groups in this economy, namely, the workers and the farmers
in each region. Here we analyze the effect of variations of τ22 on the utility, (12), of
each interest group.
Notice that the utility of the workers coincides with the real wage, except for the
constant term, µµ(1− µ)1−µ.
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The decrease of the internal trade costs in region 2, (increase in τ22) influences the
nominal wages and the price index in both regions, causing a “win-lose” outcome
in which the workers in region 2 are the winners (Lemma 3.2), while the workers in
region 1 are the losers (Lemma 3.2).
Lemma 3.1. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in
region 1, ω1, is a decreasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
Lemma 3.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in
region 2, ω2, is an increasing function of τ22, for 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
As the nominal wages of the farmers are always equal to 1, their real wages only
depend on the price index. Therefore, all welfare effects stem from the cost-of-living
effect. We show in Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4 that the price indices in both regions
are decreasing functions of τ22.
Lemma 3.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The price index in
region 1, P1, is a decreasing function of τ22 for 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
Lemma 3.4. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2, the price index in
region 2, P2, is a decreasing function of τ22 for 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
In the short-run, a decrease in the internal trade costs of one region benefits the
farmers in both regions.
Long-run effect on the distribution of industrial activity
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the possible effects of a decrease in the internal trade costs
of region 2. In the long-run, the economic activity can be asymmetrically dispersed
between regions (figure 4) or fully concentrated in region 2 (figure 5).
Point A represents the initial long-run equilibrium (in which regions have symmetric
internal and external trade costs). Industrial activity is equally divided between the
regions (L1 = L2 ⇔ f = 0.5). The real wages are obviously identical in both regions
(otherwise there would exist incentives for the workers to move to the region with
higher real wages). However, when τ22 > τ11, the economy finds a new short-run
equilibrium, point B, in which ω2 > ω1.
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Figure 4: Asymmetric dispersion
(τe = 0.5, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4). Point
A represents an initial symmetric disper-
sion equilibrium, with τ22 = τ11 = 0.95.
A small increase in τ22 from 0.95 to 0.97
raises the relative real wage in region 2
(to point B), attracting workers to that re-
gion. The long-run equilibrium (point C)
is characterized by asymmetric dispersion.
Figure 5: Concentration (τe = 0.4,
µ = 0.3 and σ = 4). Point A corresponds
to the initial symmetric dispersion equi-
librium, with τ22 = τ11 = 0.8. The varia-
tion to τ22 = 1.22τ11 raises the relative real
wage in region 2 (to point B). In the long-
run, there will be full concentration of the
industrial population in region 2 (point C).
This attracts workers from region 1. There is migration to region 2 until the real
wages coincide (figure 4) or until all workers have migrated to region 2 (figure 5).
Figure 4 shows an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium (point C) with f ∗ < 0.5 and
ω1 = ω2, while figure 5 shows a concentration equilibrium (point C) with f
∗ = 0
and ω2 > ω1.
If economic activity is initially concentrated in a region, then a variation of internal
trade costs may preserve this configuration (figure 6), or may imply that concentra-
tion can only occur in the region with the lower internal trade costs (figure 7).
An increase in τ22 favors concentration in region 2, as the basin of attraction is
enlarged. Indeed, for τ22 = 0.97 and τ11 = 0.95, we observe that any f < 0.6 (point
C), is sufficient to induce concentration in region 2.
In figure 7, we illustrate a case in which all industrial activity is initially concentrated
in region 1, with f = 1 and ω1 > ω2 (point A) and consider a decrease in the internal
trade costs in region 2 (an increase in τ22). If the new relative real wage is above
1, the decrease in the internal trade costs in region 2 will have no effect on the
spatial distribution of the industrial activity. But if the new relative real wage is
below 1 (point B), then the impact on the location of the industry is drastic. In
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Figure 6: Agglomeration in any re-
gion (τe = 0.75, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4). A
decrease in the internal trade cost of region
2 (increase in τ22 from 0.95 to 0.97) leads
the economy to point B. Economic activ-
ity concentrates in region 2 if the initial
distribution is such that f < 0.6.
Figure 7: Agglomeration in only one
region (τe = 0.75, µ = 0.3 and σ = 4).
Suppose that all economic activity is con-
centrated in region 1 (point A). An in-
crease in τ22 implies that all the industrial
activity is transfered from region 1 to re-
gion 2 (point C).
our illustration, for a τ22 = 1.1τ11, all industrial activity relocates from region 1 to
region 2 (point C with f = 0 and ω2 > ω1).
3.3 Asymmetric external trade costs
What is the impact of an asymmetry between the cost of exporting and the cost of
importing:
• On the relative real wage, in the short-run?
• On the welfare of each interest group, in the short-run?
• On the distribution of industrial activity, in the long-run?
We provide analytical results for the first two questions, and we use numerical
methods to characterize the distribution of economic activity in the long-run. The
proofs may be found on the appendix.
For the analytical results, we focus on the case in which the initial long-run equilib-
rium is characterized by symmetric dispersion of economic activity and we suppose
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that regions have initially symmetric trade costs, τ12 = τ21 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi.
Then, we consider a marginal decrease of the cost of trading goods from region 1
to region 2 (τ12 > τ21), keeping constant the cost of trading goods from region 2 to
region 1 (τ21). We may interpret τ12 > τ21 as the case in which region 2 has a lower
cost of importing.11
We study the two types of long-run equilibrium: dispersion and concentration.
Short-run effect on the relative real wage
Figures 8 and 9 show the impact of a decrease in cost of trade from region 1 to
region 2 (increase in τ12) on the relative real wage, in the short-run (starting from a
initial dispersion that is unstable and stable, respectively).
Figure 8: Liberalization is good (τi =
0.95, σ = 4, and µ = 0.96). For high µ,
a increase in τ12 increases the relative real
wage in region 2.
Figure 9: Liberalization is bad (τi =
0.95, σ = 4 and µ = 0.3). An increase in
τ12 from 0.5 to 0.52 decreases the relative
real wage in region 2, in the short-run (the
economy moves from point A to B).
In the case illustrated in figure 8, the relative real wage of region 1 decreases (from
point A to B), while figure 9 shows the opposite effect. The direction of the effect
depends on the weight of the industrial sector in the economy.
Proposition 3.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. There is
a µ∗(σ, τ) ∈ (0, 1) such that: d(ω1/ω2)
dτ12
> 0 for µ ∈ (0, µ∗) and d(ω1/ω2)
dτ12
< 0 for
µ ∈ (µ∗, 1)
11The trade costs from region 1 to region 2, τ12, are supported by consumers in region 2. As
p1 is the price of the manufactured products produced in region 1 (determined in the market),
then p1τ12 is the total price supported by consumers in region 2 when they purchase a manufacture
produced in region 1. Then, if τ12 increases, the price paid by consumers in region 2 decreases.
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Short-run effect on the welfare of each interest group
The four interest groups are the workers and the farmers in each of the regions.
The utilities (12) coincide with the real wages, except for a constant. Therefore, we
study the impact of τ12 on the real wages of each group.
We show that a decrease in τ12 increases the welfare of workers in region 1 (Propo-
sition 3.4), whereas the effect on the welfare of workers in region 2 can be positive
or negative (Proposition 3.5).
Proposition 3.4. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage
in region 1, ω1, is an increasing function of τ12, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1)
and σ > 1.
Proposition 3.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. For any
0 < τe < τi < 1, there is a µ
∗(σ, τ) ∈ (0, 1) such that: dω2
dτ12
< 0 for µ ∈ (0, µ∗) and
dω2
dτ12
> 0 for µ ∈ (µ∗, 1).
As the nominal wages of the farmers are always equal to 1, their real wages only
depend on the price index. We show that the price index in region 1, P1, is an
increasing function of τ12 (Lemma 3.5) and that the price index in region 2, P2, is a
decreasing function of τ12 (Lemma 3.6). This means that a decrease in the cost of
trading manufactured goods from region 1 to region 2 (an increase in τ12) benefits
the farmers of region 2 and penalizes the farmers of region 1.
Lemma 3.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, P1 is an
increasing function of τ12 for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Lemma 3.6. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, P2 is a
decreasing function of τ12 for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Long-run effect on the distribution of industrial activity
Figures 10 and 11 depict the long-run distribution of industrial activity. Depending
on the extent of the asymmetry of external trade costs, the economic activity can
be asymmetrically distributed between regions or fully concentrated in one region.
In figure 10, we present an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium. An increase in τ12
increases the relative real wage in region 1 attracting new workers to the region.
The migration to region 1 leads to a decrease in ω1/ω2. This process continues until
a new long-run equilibrium is reached, point C, with ω1 = ω2.
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Figure 10: Asymmetric dispersion
(τi = 0.95, σ = 4 and µ = 0.3). With
τ12 = τ21 = 0.5, there is symmetric dis-
persion (point A). However, an increase in
τ12 from 0.5 to 0.52 raises the relative real
wage in region 1, in the short-run (point
B). In the long-run, there will be asymmet-
ric dispersion, as region 1 will have more
workers than region 2 (point C).
Figure 11: Concentration (τi = 0.95,
σ = 4 and µ = 0.3). With τ12 = τ21 = 0.5,
there is symmetric dispersion (point A). A
strong decrease in the cost of trading from
region 1 to region 2 (τ12 = 1.12τ21) raises
the real wage, in the short-run (point B).
In the long-run, there is full concentra-
tion of the industrial population in region
1 (point C).
Figure 11 illustrates how a strong increase in τ12 may generate catastrophic agglo-
meration in region 1, producing a core-periphery structure.
Figures 12 and 13 describe the case in which there is an initial concentration of
economic activity. Figure 12 deals with a case in which concentration may occur
in any of the regions, while figure 13 shows a case in which all economic activity
becomes concentrated in region 2.
Figure 12 shows that an increase in τ12 enlarges the basin of attraction of the equi-
librium in which all economic activity is concentrated in region 1.
Figure 13 illustrates an environment in which region 2 initially concentrates all
industrial activity (point A, with f = 0 and ω2 > ω1). An increase in τ12 raises the
relative real wage in region 1, in the short-run (point B). As the real wage is higher
in region 1, workers migrate from region 2 to region 1. In the long-run, there is full
agglomeration in region 1 (point C).
There is a threshold degree of asymmetric trade liberalization between regions that
generates the relocation of all industrial activity from one region to the other. How-
ever, there will be no migration of workers until the the asymmetry in trade liber-
alization reaches this threshold.
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Figure 12: Agglomeration in any re-
gion (τi = 0.95, σ = 4 and µ = 0.3).
When τ12 = τ21 = 0.75, an increase in τ12
from 0.75 to 0.77 changes the critical f∗
that determines in which region all eco-
nomic activity concentrates to f∗ ≈ 0.42
(point C). For any initial f > 0.42 all
workers end up concentrating in region 1,
in the long-run.
Figure 13: Agglomeration in only one
region (τi = 0.95, σ = 4 and µ = 0.3).
Consider a initial core-periphery structure
in which all economic activity is concen-
trated in region 2 (point A). An increase
in τ12 will transfer all industrial activity
from region 2 to region 1 (point C).
4 Concluding Remarks
We have extended the model of Krugman (1991) in order to study the effects of
internal and external trade costs on the location of industrial activity as well as on
the welfare of the agents. The existence of an asymmetric dispersion equilibrium
is not surprising, given that under distinct trade costs, the regions no longer are
identical.
We find that industrial activity in a region is enhanced, ceteris paribus, by lower
internal trade costs and by higher costs of importing (lower costs of exporting).
The fact that asymmetries in the external trade costs lead to relocation of economic
activity is a natural result. However, it was not present in the work of Martin and
Rogers (1995). In their model, differentials in external trade costs only increase the
sensitivity of industrial location to differentials in the internal trade costs.12
From the point of view of welfare, a decrease of the internal trade cost of a region
benefits the workers of this region and the farmers of both regions, while the workers
of the other region become worse off.
12If internal trade costs are equal, then differentials in external trade costs have no effect.
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A decrease in the cost of trading from region 1 to region 2 benefits the workers of
region 1 and the farmers of region 2, while the farmers of region 1 become worse off.
The effect on the welfare of the workers of region 2 is positive if the weight of the
industrial sector is large, and negative otherwise.
The analytical results obtained for short-run equilibria support the numerical evi-
dence obtained for the long-run. In the long-run, numerical results indicate a new
feature, namely that of sudden agglomeration in some instances.
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5 Appendix
Proposition 3.1. When regions have equal internal trade costs, τ11 = τ22 = τi, and equal
external trade costs, τ21 = τ12 = τe, the ratio between ω1 and ω2 is the same as in the case
in which regions have only an external trade cost equal to τ = τeτi .
Proof. Let Z11 and ZK11 be the ratio between region 1’s expenditure on local manufactures
and that on manufactures from the other region in the model with equal internal and
external trade costs and in the model without internal trade costs, respectively. Then,
from (2), and for τ11 = τ22 = τi, τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ =
τe
τi
, we have:
Z11 =
E11
E12
=
(
W1τe
W2τi
)1−σ L1
L2
=
(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ L1
L2
= Z11K .
Analogously, from (3):
Z12 =
E21
E22
=
(
W1τi
W2τe
)1−σ L1
L2
=
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ L1
L2
= Z12K
Next, we show that the nominal wages, W1 and W2, when regions have equal internal
trade costs and equal external trades costs are the same as in the case in which regions
have only an external trade costs, τ = τeτi .
From (8) and (9) with τi = τ22 = τ11 and τe = τ12 = τ21, the nominal wages satisfy:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τe
W2τi
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τe
W2τi
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1τi
W2τe
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W2L2)
1 +
(
W1τi
W2τe
)1−σ
L1
L2
 ; (13)
W2 =
µ
L2
 1−µ2 +W1L1
1 +
(
W1τe
W2τ i
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
1−µ
2 +W2L2
1 +
(
W1τ i
W2τe
)1−σ
L1
L2
 . (14)
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Since τ = τeτi , (13) and (14) become:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W2L2)
1 +
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ
L1
L2
 ;
W2 =
µ
L2
 1−µ2 +W1L1
1 +
(
W1τ
W2
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
1−µ
2 +W2L2
1 +
(
W1
W2τ
)1−σ
L1
L2
 .
These expressions coincide with those of the classical model of Krugman. There is a single
equilibrium, as shown by Mossay (2006). Therefore, the nominal wages coincide:
W1 = WK1 and W2 = W
K
2 .
The inclusion of internal trade costs changes the price index of manufactured goods. Let
PM1 be the price index of manufactured goods in the model with equal internal and
external trade costs, and let PKM1 be the price index of manufactured goods in the model
without internal trade costs. For τ11 = τ22 = τi, τ12 = τ21 = τe, and τ = τeτi , we have:
PM1 = γ
[
f
(
W1
τi
)1−σ
+ (1− f)
(
W2
τe
)1−σ] 11−σ
⇔
⇔ PM1τi = γ
[
fW1
1−σ + (1− f)
(
W2
τ
)1−σ] 11−σ
= PM1K
Doing the same for PM2, we verify that the manufacturing price indexes increase to com-
pensate for the internal “iceberg” trade costs:
PM1 =
PKM1
τi
and PM2 =
PKM2
τi
.
This implies that:
ω1 =
W1
PµM1
=
WK1
(PKM1/τi)µ
= ωK1 τ
µ
i and ω2 = ω
K
2 τ
µ
i .
The internal trade costs decrease the real wages in the same proportion, therefore, the
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relative real wage remains unaltered:
ω1
ω2
=
ωK1 τ
µ
i
ωK2 τ
µ
i
=
ωK1
ωK2
Claim 5.1. If L1 = L2, then W1 +W2 = 2.
When L1 = L2, τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ22 = τ11 = τi, then W1 = W2 = 1.
Proof. Substituting L1 = L2 = µ in (7), we obtain W1 +W2 = 2.
If the trade costs are symmetric (τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ22 = τ11 = τi), then W1 = W2 = 1 is
a short-run equilibrium, as we verify below.
The nominal wage in region 1 is:
W1 =
µ
L1

(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W1L1)
1 +
(
W1τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ
L1
L2
+
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
(1−µ2 +W2L2)
1 +
(
W1τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ
L1
L2
 .
Substituting W1 = W2 = 1, L1 = L2 = µ2 , τe = τ12 = τ21 and τi = τ11 = τ22, we obtain:
1 = 2

(
τe
τi
)1−σ
1−µ+µ
2
1 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
1−µ+µ
2
1 +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
⇔
1 =

(
τe
τi
)1−σ
1 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
1 +
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
⇔
1 =
2 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ
+
(
τe
τi
)σ−1
2 +
(
τe
τi
)1−σ
+
(
τe
τi
)σ−1 ⇔
1 = 1
This short-run equilibrium is unique (Mossay, 2006).
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Claim 5.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi, and L1 = L2. Then, P1 = P2 ≥ 1.
Proof. Substituting W1 = W2 = 1, τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and f = 12 into (10) and
(11), we obtain:
P1 =
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
2
)µ/(1−σ)
,
and
P2 =
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
2
)µ/(1−σ)
We verify that P1 = P2, and since τi and τe are greater or equal than 1, P1 = P2 ≥ 1.
Claim 5.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, 0 < ω1 = ω2 ≤ 1.
Proof. The real wage is simply given by the ratio between nominal wage (W1 = W2 = 1)
and the price index (P1 = P2 ≥ 1).
ω1 = ω2 =
1
P1
=
1
P2
=
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
2
)µ/(σ−1)
We clearly have 0 < ω1 = ω2 ≤ 1.
Claim 5.4. Let L1 = L2. In the short-run:
dW1
dτi
= −dW2
dτi
,
dW1
dτe
= −dW2
dτe
and
dW1
dτ22
= −dW2
dτ22
Proof. This is a straightforward consequence of W1 +W2 = 2.
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Claim 5.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi = 1 and L1 = L2. An increase in τ22
decreases W1, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. We want to prove that
dW2
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
> 0.
By Claim 5.1, we can substitute W1 = 2−W2 in equation (9).
W2
2
=
1−µ
2 + (2−W2)µ2
1 +
(
(2−W2)τ21
W2τ11
)1−σ + 1−µ2 + W2µ2
1 +
(
(2−W2)τ22
W2τ12
)1−σ = AB + CD. (15)
We compute dW2dτ22 (denoted, below, as W
′
2) by implicit differentiation, substituting W2 = 1,
τ21 = τ12 = τe and τ11 = τ22 = τi = 1.
W ′2
2
=
A′
B
− B
′A
B2
+
C ′
D
− D
′C
D2
,
where
A = C =
1
2
, A′ = −µ
2
W ′2, C
′ =
µ
2
W ′2, B = 1 + τ
1−σ, D = 1 + τσ−1,
B′ = 2(σ − 1)τ1−σW ′2, D′ = 2(σ − 1)τσ−1
(
W ′2 −
1
2τi
)
.
With some manipulation:
W ′2
2 = −
µ
2W
′
2
1 + τ1−σ
+
µ
2W
′
2
1 + τσ−1
− (σ − 1)τ
1−σW ′2
(1 + τ1−σ)2
−
(σ − 1)τσ−1
(
W ′2 − 12τi
)
(1 + τσ−1)2
⇔
⇔ W ′2
[
1 +
µ
1 + τ1−σ
− µ
1 + τσ−1
+
(σ − 1)τ1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
]
=
(σ − 1)τσ−1
2τi (1 + τσ−1)2
.
Using the fact that τ
1−σ
(1+τ1−σ)2
= τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
:
W ′2 =
(σ−1)τσ−1
2τi(1+τσ−1)2
1 + µ
1+τ1−σ − µ1+τσ−1 + 2(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
(16)
It should be clear that W ′2 =
dW2
dτ22
is positive. Then, from Claim (5.4), we know that dW1dτ22
is negative.
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Claim 5.6. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi = and L1 = L2. An increase in τ12
increases W1, for any τi ∈ (0, 1) τe ∈ (0, τi), µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. From Claim 5.4, we know that
dW2
dτ12
= −dW1
dτ12
. Denote
dW2
dτ12
by W ′2.
Recalling (15):
W2
2
=
1−µ
2 +
µ
2 (2−W2)
1 +
(
2−W2
W2
τ21
τ11
)1−σ + 1−µ2 + µ2W2
1 +
(
2−W2
W2
τ22
τ12
)1−σ = AB + CD.
Then:
W ′2
2
=
−µ2W ′2B − (1− σ)
(
2−W2
W2
τ21
τ11
)−σ
τ21
τ11
−W ′2W2−W ′2(2−W2)
W 22
A
B2
+
+
µ
2W
′
2D − (1− σ)
(
2−W2
W2
τ22
τ12
)−σ [−W ′2W2−W ′2(2−W2)
W 22
τ22
τ12
+ 2−W2W2
(
− τ22
τ212
)]
C
D2
=
=
−µ2W ′2(1 + τ1−σ) + (1− σ)τ−στW ′2
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
+
µ
2W
′
2(1 + τ
σ−1) + (1− σ)τσ
[
W ′2τ−1 +
τi
2τ2e
]
(1 + τσ−1)2
.
Equivalently (using W ′1 = −W ′2):
W ′1
2
=
W ′1
[
(1− σ)τ1−σ − µ2 (1 + τ1−σ)
]
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
+
W ′1
[
(1− σ)τσ−1 + µ2 (1 + τσ−1)
]
(1 + τσ−1)2
−
1−σ
2τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
Solving for W ′1:
W ′1 =
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1
1−A−B , (17)
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in which:
A =
2(1− σ)τ1−σ − µ(1 + τ1−σ)
(1 + τ1−σ)2
B =
2(1− σ)τσ−1 + µ(1 + τσ−1)
(1 + τσ−1)2
It is straightforward to see that 1−A−B > 0 (only the last term is negative):
1−A−B = 1 + 2(σ − 1)τ
1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)2
+
2(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
+
µ
1 + τ1−σ
− µ
1 + τσ−1
.
Proposition 3.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. The relative real wage,
ω1
ω2
, is a decreasing function of τ22, for τe ∈ (0, 1), τi ∈ (τe, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. We want to show that
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
We have:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ22
ω2 − dω2dτ22ω1
ω22
. (18)
From Claim 5.3, we know that ω1 = ω2 > 0, therefore, (18) can be written as:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ22
− dω2dτ22
ω2
.
From Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2, we know that dω1dτ22 < 0 and
dω2
dτ22
> 0 respectively, thus:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
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Lemma 3.1. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in region 1,
ω1, is a decreasing function of τ22, for τe ∈ (0, 1), τi ∈ (τe, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. We want to show that
dω1
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
Using (7), we write W2 as function of W1, and differentiate the expression using the chain
rule and the Implicit Function Theorem.
dω1
dτ22
=
d
(
W1(W1,W2)
P1(W1,W2)
)
dτ22
=
∂W1
∂τ22
P1(W1)− dP1dτ22W1
P1(W1)2
, (19)
where
dP1
dτ22
=
[
∂P1(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
∂W1
∂τ22
]
.
From Claim 5.1, when L1 = L2, τ11 = τ22 = τi and τ12 = τ21 = τe, it is always the case
that W1 = W2 = 1. Then (19) becomes:
dω1
dτ22
=
∂W1
∂τ22
P1(W1)−
[
∂P1(W1)
∂τ22
+ ∂P1(W1)∂W1
∂W1
∂τ22
]
P1(W1)2
. (20)
From Claims 5.5 and 5.2, we know that ∂W1∂τ22 < 0 and that P1(W1) > 0.
Since P1 does not depend on the internal transportation costs of region 2, τ22, from (10)
we have that ∂P1(W1)∂τ22 = 0. Therefore, the second term in the numerator of (20) becomes:
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
∂W1
∂τ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
{
1− σ
2
[(
1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]}
∂W1
∂τ22
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21:
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)] −µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
) dW1
dτ22
. (21)
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With P1 at equilibrium values, P1 = γ
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)] −µ
σ−1 , and using (21), (20) becomes:
dω1
dτ22
=
dW1
dτ22
P1
−
µ
2P1
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
)
dW1
dτ22
P 21
=
dW1
dτ22
P1
−
µ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
)
dW1
dτ22
P1
.
To prove Lemma 3.1 we note that:
dW1
dτ22
[
1− µτ
σ−1
i − τσ−1e
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
]
< 0⇒ dω1
dτ22
< 0
Given that τi > τe, it is clear that 0 <
µ(τσ−1i −τσ−1e )
τσ−1i +τ
σ−1
e
< 1, finishing the proof.
Lemma 3.2. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The real wage in region 2,
ω2, is a increasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. We want to show that
dω2
dτ22
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
> 0.
Using (7), we write W2 as function of W1, and differentiate the expression using the chain
rule and the Implicit Function Theorem.
dω2
dτ22
=
d
(
W2(W1,W2)
P2(W1,W2)
)
dτ22
=
dW2
dτ22
P2(W1)− dP2dτ22W2
P2(W1)2
, (22)
where:
dP2
dτ22
=
[
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
]
. (23)
From (11), we compute the first term in (23):
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ (
−2−W1
τ222
)
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Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2i (24)
Secondly, we study the second term of (23):
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
dW1
dτ22
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
(25)
With (24) and (25), equation (23) becomes:
dP2
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µσ−1−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
(26)
With P2 at the equilibrium value, P2 = γ
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µ
σ−1 , equation (22) becomes:
dω2
dτ22
=
dW2
dτ22
P2
−
µ
2P2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
P 22
=
dW2
dτ22
P2
−
µ
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
P2
(27)
To prove that (27) is positive, we note that:
dW2
dτ22
− µ (τσ−1e + τσ−1i )−1 (τσ−1i − τσ−1e ) dW2dτ22 + µ (τσ−1e + τσ−1i )−1 τσ−2i =
=
dW2
dτ22
(
1− µτ
σ−1
i − τσ−1e
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)
+
µτσ−2i
τσ−1e + τσ−1i
> 0
From Claims 5.5 and 5.4, we know that dW2dτ22 > 0, thus the proof is finished.
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Lemma 3.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The price index in region
1, P1 is a decreasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. By the chain rule:
dP1
dτ22
=
∂P1(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P1(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
(28)
From (10), we know that ∂P1(W1)∂τ22 = 0, and thus (28) becomes:
dP1
dτ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
2−W1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]
dW1
dτ22
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
dP1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
) dW1
dτ22
.
As γ > 0, τi > τe and (from Claim 5.5) dW1dτ22 < 0, the proof is finished.
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Lemma 3.4. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. The price index in region
2, P2, is a decreasing function of τ22, for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. By the chain rule:
dP2
dτ22
=
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
+
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
. (29)
From (11), we compute the first term of (29):
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ (
−2−W1
τ222
)
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21 above, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂τ22
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2i (30)
Secondly, we study the second term of (29):
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
dW1
dτ22
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2(W1)
∂W1
dW1
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
(31)
With (30) and (31), we compute dP2dτ22 :
dP2
dτ22
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µσ−1−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
− τσ−2i
]
(32)
Given that, in (32), γµ2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µ
σ−1−1 is positive, to finish the proof we need to
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show the following inequality:
(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ22
< τσ−2i ⇔ τi(1− τσ−1)
dW2
dτ22
< 1
Importing the expression (16):
τi(1− τσ−1)
(σ−1)τσ−1
2τi(1+τσ−1)2
1 + µ
1+τ1−σ − µ1+τσ−1 + 2(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
< 1⇔
⇔ 1− τ
σ−1
2
(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
< 1 +
µ
1 + τ1−σ
− µ
1 + τσ−1
+
2(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
.
Since the expression on the left is lower than the last term of the expression on the right,
the proof is finished.
Proposition 3.3. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. There is a µ∗(σ, τ) ∈
(0, 1) such that: d(ω1/ω2)dτ12 > 0 for µ ∈ (0, µ∗) and
d(ω1/ω2)
dτ12
< 0 for µ ∈ (µ∗, 1).
Proof. We want to know the sign of:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ12
ω2 − dω2dτ12ω1
ω22
,
where
dω1
dτ12
=
d
(
W1
P1
)
dτ12
=
dW1
dτ12
P1 −
(
∂P1
∂τ12
+ ∂P1∂W1
dW1
dτ12
)
W1
P 21
and
dω2
dτ12
=
d
(
W2
P2
)
dτ12
=
dW2
dτ12
P2 −
(
∂P2
∂τ12
+ ∂P2∂W1
dW1
dτ12
)
W2
P 22
.
When L1 = L2, τ22 = τ11 = τi and τ12 = τ21 = τe, from Claims 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, we know
that W1 = W2 = 1, P1 = P2 and ω1 = ω2. Simplifying:
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dω1
dτ12
− dω2dτ12
ω2
,
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with
dω1
dτ12
− dω2
dτ12
=
(
dW1
dτ12
− dW2dτ12
)
P1 + ∂P2∂τ12 − ∂P1∂τ12 + ∂P2∂W1 dW1dτ12 − ∂P1∂W1 dW1dτ12
P 21
.
From Claim 5.4 and (10), we know that dW1dτ12 = −dW2dτ12 and that ∂P1∂τ12 = 0. Then:
dω1
dτ12
− dω2
dτ12
=
1
P 21
[
dW1
dτ12
(
2P1 +
∂P2
∂W1
− ∂P1
∂W1
)
+
∂P2
∂τ12
]
The next stage is to compute ∂P2∂W1 ,
∂P1
∂W1
and ∂P2∂τ12 .
Using (11), we find:
∂P2
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τ11 = τ22 = τi, τ12 = τ21 = τe and P1 = γ
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µ
σ−1 :
∂P2
∂W1
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
=
= µP1
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
τσ−1e + τσ−1i
= −µP1 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
.
Using (10) we find that ∂P1∂W1 = − ∂P2∂W1 :
∂P1
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
2−W1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]
=
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
)
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From (11), we compute ∂P2∂τ12 :
∂P2
∂τ12
= − µ
σ − 1γ
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
1− σ
2
(
W1
τ12
)−σ (
−W1
τ212
)
= −γµ
2
τσ−2e
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
= −µP1 τ
σ−2
e
τσ−1e + τσ−1i
= −µP1 τ
σ−1τ−1e
1 + τσ−1
.
Then, replacing:
P1
(
dω1
dτ12
− dω2
dτ12
)
= 2
dW1
dτ12
(
1− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
)
− µτ
−1
e τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
.
The sign of d(ω1/ω2)dτ12 is positive whenever:
dW1
dτ12
>
µτ−1e
2
τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1− µ1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
=
µτ−1e
2 τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1 − µ(1− τσ−1) .
Importing the expression (17) for W ′1 > 0 obtained in Claim 5.6:
W ′1 =
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1
1−A−B ,
where
A = −2(σ − 1)τ
1−σ
(1 + τ1−σ)2
− µ
1 + τ1−σ
, and B = −2(σ − 1)τ
σ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
+
µ
1 + τσ−1
.
Recalling that τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
= τ
1−σ
(1+τ1−σ)2
, we know that d(ω1/ω2)dτ12 > 0 if and only if:
σ − 1
1 + 4(σ − 1) τσ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
+ µ
1+τ1−σ − µ1+τσ−1
>
µ
2 (1 + τ
σ−1)2
1 + τσ−1 − µ(1− τσ−1) .
With some manipulation:
2(σ − 1)
(1 + τσ−1)2
>
µ+ 4µ(σ − 1) τσ−1
(1+τσ−1)2
− µ2 1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1 + τσ−1 − µ(1− τσ−1) .
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In is clear that this is true when µ→ 0. When µ→ 1, the expression becomes:
4(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
> 1 +
4(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
− 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
2τσ−1,
which is clearly false.
To show that the expression is true if and only if µ is lower or equal than some µ∗ ∈ (0, 1),
notice that it is equivalent to a U-shaped parabola.
d (ω1/ω2)
dτ12
> 0⇔ aµ2 + bµ+ c > 0, where a = 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
.
Proposition 3.4. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, ω1, is an
increasing function of τ12, for any τe ∈ (0, 1), τi ∈ (τe, 1), µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. We want to show that
dω1
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
> 0.
dω1
dτ12
=
d
(
W1
P1
)
dτ12
=
dW1
dτ12
P1 −
[
∂P1
∂τ12
+ ∂P1∂W1
dW1
dτ12
]
W1
P 21
(33)
When L1 = L2, τ11 = τ22 = τi and τ12 = τ21 = τe, from Claim 5.1 we know that W1 = 1
and from (10) we find that ∂P1∂τ12 = 0. Then, simplifying (33):
dω1
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dW1
dτ12
P1 − ∂P1∂W1 dW1dτ12
P 21
(34)
From (10) we evaluate:
∂P1
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
[
1
2
(τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e )
]− µ
σ−1−1 1− σ
2
(τσ−1i − τσ−1e ) = µP1
1− τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
< P1.
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Proposition 3.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ22 = τ11 = τi and L1 = L2. For any 0 < τe < τi <
1, there exists a µ∗(σ, τ) ∈ (0, 1) such that:
dω2
dτ12
< 0 for µ ∈ (0, µ∗) and dω2dτ12 > 0 for µ ∈ (µ∗, 1).
Proof. We want to show that
dω2
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
< 0.
dω2
dτ12
=
d
(
W2
P2
)
dτ12
=
dW2
dτ12
P2 −
(
∂P2
∂τ12
+ ∂P2∂W1
dW1
dτ12
)
W2
P 22
(35)
From Claim 5.1 we can rewrite (35) in the following way:
dω2
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
dW2
dτ12
P2 − ∂P2∂τ12 − ∂P2∂W1 dW1dτ12
P 22
(36)
From Claim 5.6 we know that dW1dτ12 > 0 and from Claim 5.4 we know that
dW2
dτ12
= −dW1dτ12 .
Then, the sign of (36) is the same as the sign of:
−dW1
dτ12
(
P2 +
∂P2
∂W1
)
− ∂P2
∂τ12
.
From (11):
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
[
1− σ
2
(
W1
τ12
)−σ (−W1
τ212
)]
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 [σ − 1
2
τσ−2e
]
=
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2e = −µP2τ−1e
τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
(37)
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Again from (11):
∂P2
∂W1
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂W1
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
)
= −µP2 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
. (38)
With (37) and (38), we observe that:
dω2
dτ12
< 0⇔ dW1
dτ12
(
1− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
)
− µτ−1e
τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
> 0.
Importing the expression (17) obtained in Claim 5.6:
dW1
dτ12
=
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1
1 + 4(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2 − µ1−τ
σ−1
1+τσ−1
.
Thus dω2dτ12 < 0 if and only if:
σ−1
τe
τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
1− µ1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1 + 4(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2 − µ1−τ
σ−1
1+τσ−1
> µτ−1e
τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
⇔
⇔ σ − 1
1 + τσ−1
1− µ1−τσ−1
1+τσ−1
1 + 4(σ−1)τ
σ−1
(1+τσ−1)2 − µ1−τ
σ−1
1+τσ−1
> µ⇔
⇔ σ − 1
1 + τσ−1
(
1− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
)
− µ
[
1 +
4(σ − 1)τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
− µ1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
]
> 0.
The expression on the left is a U-shaped parabola, therefore, all we need to check is that
the inequality is true when µ → 0 and false when µ → 1. It is easy to see that when
µ→ 0, the inequality is true. When µ→ 1, the inequality becomes:
σ − 1
1 + τσ−1
− (σ − 1)(1− τ
σ−1)
(1 + τσ−1)2
− 1− 4(σ − 1)τ
σ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
+
1− τσ−1
1 + τσ−1
> 0⇔
⇔ (σ − 1)
[ −2τσ−1
(1 + τσ−1)2
]
− 1 + 1− τ
σ−1
1 + τσ−1
> 0.
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Which is clearly false.
Lemma 3.5. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, the price index
in region 1, P1, is an increasing function of τ12 for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and
σ > 1.
Proof. Observe that:
dP1
dτ12
∣∣∣∣
L1=L2
=
∂P1
∂τ12
+
∂P1
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
. (39)
As ∂P1∂τ12 = 0, (39) becomes:
dP1
dτ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ11
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ21
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ11
)−σ
τ−111 −
(
2−W1
τ21
)−σ
τ−121
]}
dW1
dτ12
.
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
dP1
dτ12
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1i + τ
σ−1
e
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1i − τσ−1e
) dW1
dτ12
From Claim 5.6, we know that ∂W1∂τ12 > 0.
Lemma 3.6. Let τ21 = τ12 = τe, τ11 = τ22 = τi and L1 = L2. Then, the price index in
region 2, P2, is a decreasing function of τ12 for any 0 < τe < τi < 1, µ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1.
Proof. Observe that:
dP2
τ12
=
∂P2
∂τ12
+
∂P2
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
(40)
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Firstly, we study the first term in (40):
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
[
1− σ
2
(
W1
τ12
)−σ (−W1
τ212
)]
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂τ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)] −µσ−1−1 [σ − 1
2
τσ−2e
]
= −γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1
τσ−2e (41)
Secondly, we study the second term in (40), then:
∂P2
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
= − γµ
σ − 1
{
1
2
[(
W1
τ12
)1−σ
+
(
2−W1
τ22
)1−σ]}− µσ−1−1
×
{
1− σ
2
[(
W1
τ12
)−σ
τ−112 −
(
2−W1
τ22
)−σ
τ−122
]}
dW1
dτ12
Replacing W1 = 1, τi = τ11 = τ22 and τe = τ12 = τ21, we obtain:
∂P2
∂W1
dW1
dτ12
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 (
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) dW1
dτ12
(42)
Adding (41) and (42), we obtain:
dP2
dτ12
=
γµ
2
[
1
2
(
τσ−1e + τ
σ−1
i
)]− µσ−1−1 [(
τσ−1e − τσ−1i
) ∂W1
∂τ12
− τσ−2e
]
. (43)
From Claim 5.6, dW1dτ12 > 0, which implies that
dP2
dτ12
< 0.
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